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The aim of my paper this afternoon is to examine some of the major facets of the 
Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence that impact upon the domain of administrative law. I 
do not intend to deal, because of the obvious constraints of time, with the (numerous 
and important) influences of the Strasbourg case-law on the development of our own 
domestic judicial review principles (such as the test for non-pecuniary bias in English 
law). 
 
(1) Institutional and procedural requirements of bodies created to resolve 
disputes between persons and public authorities 
There is a very rich seam of jurisprudence on this topic, with Benthem v Netherlands 
A.97 (1985) being a major early judgment. He claimed that the determination of his 
application for a licence to build/operate an LPG facility had not been made by an 
“independent and impartial tribunal” as required under Article 6(1) ECHR. The 
Administrative Litigation Division of the Council of State had delivered an opinion in 
favour of the Health Inspector’s appeal. The  Minister of Health/Crown then issued a 
Decree quashing B’s licence. Court held that: 
“40. ...a power of decision is inherent in the very notion of “tribunal” within the 
meaning of the Convention... Yet the Division tenders only an advice.” 
Consequently, the ALD did not satisfy the requirements of Article 6(1). Nor did the final 
Ministerial decision/Royal Decree as it had been made by a member of the executive 
(indeed the hierarchical superior of the Health Inspector) and it was not susceptible to 
judicial review. Hence from the Court’s perspective the Dutch appeals system was not 
sufficiently independent from the executive. 
 A similar challenge to the English planning appeals system was brought a decade 
later in Bryan v UK A.335-A (1995). Landowner appealed against an enforcement notice 
served on him by his local planning authority. Determined by a planning inspector (full-
time employee of an executive agency- bound to follow the published planning policies of 
the Environment Minister- could have individual appeals withdrawn from them by the 
Minister at any time prior to an inspector issuing his/her decision) rejected B.’s appeal. 
B. subsequently, unsuccessfully, appealed (on a point of law) to the High Court against 
inspector’s decision. Before the Strasbourg Court B. contended that the inspector did not 
constitute an “independent tribunal” . Court noted that: 
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“37. In order to establish whether a body can be considered “independent”, regard 
must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their 
term of office, to the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and to the 
question whether the body presents an appearance of independence... 
Whilst the Court found that  inspectors were bound to reach their decisions via a quasi-
judicial procedure, the (rarely used) power of the Minister to withdraw appeals from 
them deprived inspectors of the required appearance of independence. As to the 
applicant’s High Court appeal: 
“44. The Court notes that the appeal to the High Court, being on “points of law”, 
was not capable of embracing all aspects of the inspector’s decision concerning the 
enforcement notice served on Mr Bryan. In particular, as is not infrequently the 
case in relation to administrative-law appeals in the Council of Europe member 
States, there was no rehearing as such of the original complaints submitted to the 
inspector, the High Court could not substitute its own decision on the merits for 
that of the inspector; and its jurisdiction over the facts was limited.” 
But, the Court concluded that the High Court had jurisdiction to overturn the inspector’s 
decision if it was based on irrational findings of fact. Consequently, the combination of 
appeal processes before the inspector and the High Court met the requirements of 
Article 6(1). 
 So a crucial difference between the procedures in Benthem 
and Bryan was that the English planning appeals system was subject to a final 
determination by the domestic courts.  
 More recently the full-time Court has re-stated the unacceptability, under Article 
6(1), of appellate bodies being closely linked with the administrative authority whose 
decision is being challenged. In Tsfayo v UK (Judgment of 14 November 2006) the 
applicant’s retrospective claim for housing benefit was dismissed by a council official. 
With legal representation Tsfayo appealed to the council’s Housing Review Board 
(composed of 5 councillors). After a hearing the Board rejected her appeal (they did not 
accept the applicant’s account of events). She brought judicial review proceedings 
against the Board, but leave was refused as the ECHR was not (then) enforceable in 
domestic law and the Board’s decision was not irrational. The Strasbourg Court 
considered that: 
“40. ...disputes over entitlement to social security and welfare benefits generally 
fall within the scope of Article 6(1)...” 
This case could be distinguished from Bryan because the Board: 
“47. ..was not merely lacking in independence from the executive, but was directly 
connected to one of the parties to the dispute, since it included five councillors 
from the local authority which would be required to pay the benefit if awarded.” 
Furthermore, the High Court did not have jurisdiction to review the central issue of the 
Board’s decision regarding the credibility of the applicant’s testimony. Therefore, a 
breach of Article 6(1) had occurred. 
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 We may speculate that the Court was encouraged in its robust application of 
Article 6(1) in Tsfayo as it was supported by the public views of the Council on Tribunals 
which since 1988 had been calling for the abolition of the Housing Review Boards due to 
their lack of independence. Parliament had legislated in 2000 to replace them with 
appeals to independent statutory tribunals. 
From the previous case-law we can see that the Court has: 
-expanded the range of governmental decision-making subject to the express positive 
obligation of determination by an independent and impartial tribunal; 
-whilst recognising the needs of States to have specialist administrative appeals 
processes the Court requires that those bodies are sufficiently independent of the 
executive, have decision-making powers and are ultimately subject to review by the  
ordinary/administrative courts. 
 
(2) The scope of the right of civil/public servants to have access to a court to 
determine their employment disputes 
Over the last decade there have been astonishing convolutions in the Court’s approach 
to civil/public servants claims. 
In Pellegrin v  France (Judgment of 8 December 1999) the Grand Chamber considered 
that the existing case-law on this matter: 
“60. ...contains a margin of  uncertainty for Contracting States as to the scope of 
their obligations under Article 6(1) in disputes raised by employees in the  public 
sector over their conditions of service.  ... 
61. The Court therefore wishes to put an end to the uncertainty which surrounds 
application of the guarantees of Article 6(1) to disputes between States and their 
servants.” 
To that end the Grand Chamber, influence by EU law/practice, elaborated a new 
functional test that civil/public servants who exercised the sovereign power of the State 
were excluded from the guarantee of access to a court to resolve their employment 
disputes. A majority then applied the new approach to determine that the applicant, a 
management consultant employed by the French Ministry of Development to assist the 
government of Equatorial Guinea on its budget, fell within the excluded category of 
public servants. However, 4 dissenters (Judges Tulkens,  Fischbach, Casadevall and 
Thomassen) argued that the majority’s new approach risked creating arbitrariness and 
uncertainty. 
Eight years later another Grand Chamber, with Judge Tulkens having the majority 
on her side on this occasion, overruled Pellegrin. The applicants in Vilho Eskelinen and 
Others v Finland (judgment of 19 April 2007) , were several police officers and an 
administrator working for the police who had their local wage supplements removed 
when their police district was re-organised. The applicants unsuccessfully challenged the 
loss of their supplements before the domestic courts. Eventually, the applicants 
complained to Strasbourg alleging breaches of Article 6(1) by the Finnish courts, 
including excessive delays. A majority of twelve Judges concluded that the Pellegrin 
functional criterion approach could produce “anomalous results”, as in this case where 
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the police officer applicants would not be protected by Article 6(1) but the administrator 
would be. Nor had it been easy to determine its application in subsequent cases.  
“55. The Court can only conclude that the functional criterion, as applied in 
practice, has not simplified the analysis of the applicability of Article 6 in 
proceedings to which a civil servant is a party or brought about a greater degree of 
certainty in this area as intended (see, mutatis mutandis, Perez v. France [GC], no. 
47287/99, § 55, ECHR 2004-I.). 
56. It is against this background and for these reasons that the Court finds that the 
functional criterion adopted in the case of Pellegrin must be further developed.” 
The majority then set out a two-fold test to determine if particular civil servants had 
been excluded from the judicial protection of Article 6(1): 
-Did the national law excluded the applicant from access to a court; 
-If so, was that exclusion justifiable on objective grounds of state interest? 
Applying these new criteria the majority ruled that, as all the applicants had a right of 
access to the courts under Finnish law, Article 6(1) was applicable to them and it had 
been breached by the excessive delays in resolving the litigation. The current and former 
Presidents of the Court, together with three other judges, issued a joint dissent in which 
they deplored the majority’s abandoning of the Pellegrin approach. 
The outcome of Vilho is likely to increase the numbers of civil/public servants who 
will be able to assert a right of access to a court to settle their employment disputes. 
 
(3) Implied procedural obligations placed upon public authorities 
Another category of positive obligations created by the Court apply to public authorities 
responsible for a diverse range of functions from child welfare to environmental 
protection. These obligations have their basis in Article 8’s requirement that States 
“respect” the rights elaborated in Article 8(1). For example, in W. v UK A.121-A (1987) 
the applicant/father complained about a local authority assuming parental rights over his 
child. The Court held that: 
“62.  ...It is true that Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, but 
this is not conclusive of the matter. The local authority’s decision-making process 
clearly cannot be devoid of influence on the substance of the decision, notably by 
ensuring that it is based on the relevant considerations and not one-sided and, 
hence, neither is nor appears to be arbitrary. Accordingly, the Court is entitled to 
have regard to that process to determine whether it has been conducted in a 
manner that, in all the circumstances, is fair and affords due respect to the 
interests protected by Article 8...” 
The Court found that the applicant had not been given an opportunity to participate in 
the council’s decision-making process and a breach of his right to respect for his family 
life had thereby occurred. 
 Later in T.P. and K.M. v UK (Judgment of 10 May 2001) the full-time developed 
W. to require public authorities to disclose relevant information to a parent whose child 
has been taken into care. The first applicant (a single mother) had her daughter (the 
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second applicant) taken into care at the instigation of a local authority (which feared the 
child was being subject to sexual abuse). The local authority had a video recording of the 
child identifying her abuser, but the authority would not disclose it to the first applicant. 
The Strasbourg Court ruled that: 
“82.  ...The positive obligation on the Contracting State to protect the interests of 
the family requires that this material be made available to the parent concerned, 
even in the absence of any request by the parent. If there were any doubts as to 
whether this posed a risk to the welfare of the child, the matter should have been 
submitted to the court by the local authority at the earliest stage in the 
proceedings possible for it to resolve the issue involved. 
As the local authority had failed to do this Article 8 had been violated.  
 Of course, the Court has recognised that public authorities are entitles to take 
unilateral action to safeguard children, without involving their parents, where emergency 
circumstances exist. But, this exception has been applied restrictively, e.g. in K. and T. v 
Finland (Judgment of 12 July 2001) a pregnant woman suffering from serious mental 
illness went into hospital to give birth. The local Social Director issued an emergency 
care order taking the baby into public care, which was served on the hospital and the 
baby was removed from her mother soon after being born. The Grand Chamber held 
that: 
“168.  ...the taking of a new-born baby into public care at the moment of its birth 
is an extremely harsh measure. There must be extraordinarily compelling reasons 
before a baby can be physically removed from the care of its mother, against her 
will, immediately after birth as a consequence of a procedure in which neither she 
nor her partner has been involved.” 
Here it had not been necessary for such an order to be made. 
 Another Grand Chamber has required public authorities to utilise “appropriate 
investigations and studies” when balancing the conflicting interests (including national 
economic well-being and the minimising of pollution affecting local residents) involved in 
regulating plane usage of airports. In the leading case of Hatton and others v UK 
(judgment of 8 July 2003) the majority of the Court concluded that the night-flights 
quota system applied by the government to Heathrow airport satisfied the implied 
procedural obligations under Article 8 as it had been preceded by public consultations 
and supported by research into sleep disturbance. 
 
(4) Challenges to the social and economic policies of public authorities 
We will (briefly) examine some of the Strasbourg litigation that has sought to extend the 
scope of Convention rights into fields occupied by later generational rights. 
Recognition of the “new” personality of transsexuals 
From Rees v UK A.106 (1986) to Christine Goodwin v UK (judgment of 11 July 2002) the 
Court, following the evolving European consensus, increased the pressure on the British 
authorities to provide full recognition of the new personalities/identities of post-operative 
transsexuals. Such that by the time of Christine Goodwin the Grand Chamber was no 
longer willing to accept that administrative concessions to such persons (e.g. such as the 
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provision of new driving licences and passports) satisfied their right to respect for their 
private lives. Only full legal recognition would be compatible with Article 8. 
 
Protection from severe environmental pollution 
We have already seen how the Court has scrutinised the procedures followed by public 
authorities responsible for controlling pollution in Hatton. There is also an extensive body 
of Strasbourg jurisprudence that requires domestic authorities to establish regulatory 
systems and harm reduction programmes over serious pollution (created by both private 
enterprise and public agencies) that adversely affects persons’ homes and family/private 
lives from Powell and Rayner v UK A.172 (1990) onwards.  Where administrative 
authorities fail to enforce/observe domestic environmental regulations the Court is likely 
to find a breach of Article 8, as in Lopez Ostra v Spain A.303C (1994), Guerra v Italy 
1998-I and Fadeyeva v Russia (Judgment of 9 June 2005). Indeed, where such failures 
result in deaths breaches of Article 2 (right to life) may be found. A tragic illustration is 
Oneryildiz v Turkey (Judgment of 30 November 2004) where several members of the 
applicant’s family had been killed in their home as a result of an explosion in a 
neighbouring municipal refuse tip. Two years prior to the explosion (caused by methane 
gas produced by the decaying refuse) an official report on the site had found that the 
site did not comply with national environmental regulations and there was a serious risk 
of an explosion occurring. The Grand Chamber held that: 
“89. The positive obligation to take all appropriate steps to safeguard life for the 
purposes of Article 2 entails above all a primary duty on the State to put in place a 
legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence 
against threats to the right to life... 
90. This obligation indisputably applies in the particular context of dangerous 
activities, where in addition, special emphasis must be placed on regulations 
geared to the special features of the activity in question, particularly with regard to 
the level of the potential risk to human lives. They must govern the licensing, 
setting up, operation, security and supervision of the activity and must make it 
compulsory for all those concerned to take practical measures to ensure the 
effective protection of citizens whose lives might be endangered by the inherent 
risks.” 
The Grand Chamber concluded that there had been a breach of Article 2 due to failures 
in the Turkish town planning/environmental policies and the enforcement of domestic 
regulations in the context of a known  hazard. 
So positive obligations under both Article 8 and 2 can be invoked to challenge the 
content and (non) enforcement of pollution policies. 
 
Provision of a home 
In Mazari v Italy (Decision of 4 May 1999) the Court expressed the view that: 
“...although Article 8 does not guarantee the right to have one’s housing problem 
solved by the authorities, a refusal of the authorities to provide assistance in this 
respect to an individual suffering from a severe disease might in certain 
circumstances raise an issue under Article 8...” 
The applicant was classified as disabled due to a serious metabolic disease and the 
authorities had provided him with a flat (and were willing to make modifications to the 
accommodation in accordance with the recommendations of an expert body). 
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Consequently, the Court considered that the authorities had fulfilled their positive 
obligation to the applicant and his application was declared inadmissible. 
 Subsequently, a Grand Chamber was deeply divided over the extent of States’ 
housing obligations in Chapman v UK (Judgment of 18 January 2001), where the 
applicant gypsy complained about planning enforcement action taken against her for 
residing in her caravan on agricultural land. The majority believed that: 
“99. It is important to recall that Article 8 does not in terms give a right to be 
provided with a home. Nor does any of the jurisprudence of the Court acknowledge 
such a right. While it is clearly desirable that every human being has a place where 
he or she live in dignity and which he or she can call home, there are unfortunately 
in the Contracting States many persons who have no home. Whether the State 
provides funds to enable everyone to have a home is a matter for political not 
judicial decision.” 
Whereas, 7 dissentients considered that, following Marzani: 
“...it is not the Court’s case-law that a right to be provided with a home is totally 
outside the ambit of Article 8.” 
 The cautious approach of the majority in Chapman was followed in O’Rourke v UK 
(Decision of 26 June 2001), where a released prisoner (with chest problems) was 
provided with temporary accommodation by a council. However, he was evicted due to 
assaults on fellow residents. The council advised him to go to a night shelter whilst it 
sought to find other accommodation for him. In the light of Chapman the Court 
expressed the view, “that the scope of any positive obligation to house the homeless 
must be limited.” The council’s advice and searches had discharged the obligation upon 
the State. 
 The Court has trodden a circumspect path between a complete refusal to imply 
any kind of  housing obligation into Article 8 and the recognition that some positive 
obligations arise in respect of assisting sick homeless persons. 
 
Provision of help for the disabled 
Natural link with the above housing cases. There has also been litigation by disabled 
persons seeking other forms of assistance from public authorities. For example, in Molka 
v Poland  (Decision of 11 April 2006) the wheel-chair bound applicant complained that he 
had been unable to gain physical access to a polling station in order to vote in municipal 
elections. The Court, of its own motion, raised the issue   whether a breach of Article 8 
had occurred. 
“More generally, the Court observes that the effective enjoyment of many of the 
Convention rights by disabled persons may require the adoption of various positive 
measures by the competent State authorities.” 
However, in determining the extent of these positive obligations the domestic authorities 
were to be accorded a wide margin of appreciation as these measures involved the 
allocation of limited public resources. 
“In view of their awareness of the funds available to provide such access for 
disabled persons, the national authorities are in a better position to carry out this 
assessment than an international court.” 
Having regard to the fact that the applicant had only been unable to vote on one 
occasion and that since 2001 legislation had required all polling stations used for 
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parliamentary elections (the same locations were also generally used for local elections) 
to be accessible for disabled voters, the Court determined that the application was 
inadmissible. 
 Again we see the Court being very cautious in imposing potentially extensive and 
costly social positive obligations on States. Indeed, Warbrick has argued that: 
“the ECHR does not protect economic and social rights, explicitly (with the 
exception of the right to education) or impliedly.” C. Warbrick, “Economic and 
Social Interests and the ECHR” in Economic, Social & Cultural Rights in Action ed. 
By M.A. Baderin & R. McCorquodale (OUP, 2007) at p.241. 
 
Conclusions 
We have now analysed how the Strasbourg jurisprudence on States’ positive obligations 
under the Convention has had a number of important interactions with the concerns of 
administrative law. These include: 
-requiring fair decision-making procedures to be followed by public authorities when 
performing a variety tasks; 
-ensuring the independence of specialist administrative appeals systems; 
-facilitating public servants having access to a court for the determination of their 
employment disputes. 
Alongside these traditional procedural interests of administrative lawyers the Court has 
also been willing to contemplate the expansion of States’ positive obligations under the 
Convention into areas of social/economic policymaking. Applicants have been most 
successful in litigation directed at States’ responsibility for environmental pollution and 
(eventually) regarding the recognition of transsexuals. 
The above case-law vividly demonstrates the creativity of the Court in developing both 
express and implied positive obligations from the text of the ECHR. 
 
 
 
